The emergence of sophisticated artificial intelligence models like DeepSeek’s R1 has sent ripples across the Western technology landscape, prompting necessary introspection about strategies concerning AI development, particularly around the often-competing demands of cost-effectiveness and cutting-edge capability. However, the implications extend far beyond mere technical benchmarks or economic efficiencies. The trajectory highlighted by DeepSeek forces a more profound and urgent consideration: What does the rise of specific types of AI, especially those championed by non-democratic states, signify for the future health and principles of democracy itself in an era increasingly shaped by algorithms?
At the heart of this challenge lies the concept of open-source AI. This refers to AI systems where the fundamental components – ranging from the underlying code to the datasets used for training – are made publicly accessible. This transparency allows users not just to utilize the tools but also to study their inner workings, modify them for specific purposes, and share their innovations. While the precise definition of ‘open source’ in the context of complex AI models is still debated, its potential is immense. It promises to democratize AI development, fostering a vibrant ecosystem where developers can collaborate and build upon each other’s work. This collaborative spirit can empower individuals, researchers, and communities to tailor AI solutions for critical sectors like education, healthcare delivery, and financial services, potentially unlocking significant innovation and accelerating economic progress across the board.
Yet, this promising technological avenue carries inherent complexities and risks, particularly concerning its governance and underlying values. Reports surrounding the DeepSeek R1 model, for instance, suggest it may incorporate mechanisms that censor or selectively withhold information from users. This single example underscores a larger peril: democratic nations aren’t merely risking falling behind in the technological race for superior AI performance. They face the equally critical danger of ceding ground in the crucial battle to shape the governance of AI, potentially allowing systems embedded with authoritarian principles to proliferate globally, overshadowing those designed to uphold democratic norms like freedom of expression and access to information.
Therefore, the current moment demands a proactive and coordinated response. It is imperative for the United States to forge a strong partnership with its democratic allies, with the European Union being a particularly vital collaborator, to establish global standards and best practices specifically for open-source AI. Leveraging their existing legislative frameworks and considerable market influence, these transatlantic partners should spearhead the creation of a robust governance structure for this burgeoning field. A critical first step involves officially coalescing around a functional definition of open-source AI to ensure regulatory clarity and effectiveness. Following this, a concerted acceleration of efforts is needed to ensure that democratic values – transparency, fairness, accountability, and respect for fundamental rights – are deeply embedded within the open-source AI models being developed and promoted. Such a strategic push is essential to pave the way for an AI future that is genuinely open, transparent, and empowering for all, rather than one subtly shaped by autocratic control.
China’s Calculated Embrace of Openness
Understanding the current dynamics requires appreciating China’s strategic maneuvers in the AI domain. Part of DeepSeek’s notable success isn’t just technical prowess; it aligns with increasingly clear signals from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) indicating an intent to integrate the norm-setting of open-source AI directly into its legal and policy architecture. A significant indicator arrived in April 2024 with the draft Model AI Law. This document explicitly articulates Beijing’s support for cultivating a domestic open-source AI ecosystem.
Article 19 of this draft law proclaims that the state ‘promotes construction of the open source ecosystem’ and actively ‘supports relevant entities in building or operating open source platforms, open source communities, and open source projects.’ It goes further, encouraging companies to make ‘software source code, hardware designs, and application services publicly available,’ ostensibly to foster industry-wide sharing and collaborative innovation. Perhaps most tellingly, the draft suggests reducing or even removing legal liability for entities providing open-source AI models, contingent upon establishing governance systems compliant with ‘national standards’ and implementing ‘corresponding safety measures.’ This represents a potentially significant shift from previous AI-related legislation in China, which often emphasized the protection of user rights more explicitly. While still a draft, the specific provisions within the Model AI Law offer a valuable blueprint, revealing how China envisions deploying open-source AI domestically and, crucially, what characteristics its exported AI models might possess.
Further reinforcing this strategic direction is the AI Safety Governance Framework, a document China intends to leverage internationally to ‘promote international collaboration on AI safety governance at a global level.’ This framework echoes the nation’s growing assertiveness regarding open-source AI. Drafted by China’s National Technical Committee 260 on Cybersecurity – a body closely linked with the powerful Cyberspace Administration of China, whose cybersecurity guidelines were formally adopted by the CCP in September 2024 – the framework states unequivocally: “We should promote knowledge sharing in AI, make AI technologies available to the public under open-source terms, and jointly develop AI chips, frameworks, and software.” The inclusion of such a strong statement in a document aimed at a global audience clearly signals China’s ambition not just to participate in the open-source AI movement, but to position itself as a leading advocate and standard-setter in this critical technological sphere. This calculated embrace of ‘openness,’ however, operates within a distinctly controlled environment, aiming to harness the innovative power of open source while maintaining alignment with state objectives.
America’s Hesitation: Defense Over Direction
Across the Pacific, the narrative surrounding open-source AI in the United States presents a study in contrasts. For some time now, advocates within the tech industry and academia have championed the considerable benefits of open-source approaches. Prominent industry figures have publicly urged the US government to place a greater strategic emphasis on fostering open-source AI development. A notable example is Mark Zuckerberg’s launch of the open-source model Llama 3.1, accompanied by his assertion that open source ‘represents the world’s best shot’ at creating widespread ‘economic opportunity and security for everyone.’
Despite this vocal advocacyfrom influential quarters, the United States has conspicuously failed to establish any significant legislative framework specifically designed to promote or guide the development of open-source AI. While a US senator introduced a bill in 2023 aimed at constructing a framework for open-source software security, this legislation has languished without meaningful progress. Federal agencies have touched upon the issue, but often with a cautious or reactive posture. Last year, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) published a report examining dual-use AI foundation models with ‘open weights.’ It’s important to note that ‘open weights’ typically signifies that the model’s parameters are available for use, but it doesn’t necessarily meet the full criteria for being truly open source (which often includes access to training data and code). The NTIA report advised the government to intensify its monitoring of the potential risks associated with these open-weight models to better determine appropriate restrictions. Subsequently, the Biden administration’s final AI regulatory framework adopted a somewhat more lenient stance towards open models, setting stricter requirements for the most powerful closed-weight models while largely excluding open-weight models from these specific constraints.
Nevertheless, a clear, proactive national strategy for championing democratic open-source AI remains elusive. The future direction under potential leadership changes adds another layer of uncertainty. Former President Donald Trump has not articulated a specific policy or guidance regarding open-source AI. While he repealed President Biden’s initial AI executive order, the replacement order issued did not outline any concrete initiatives dedicated to fostering or steering the development of open-source AI.
Overall, the American approach appears predominantly defensive. The primary focus seems to be on developing highly capable, often proprietary, AI models while simultaneously expending significant effort to prevent adversaries, particularly China, from accessing advanced semiconductor technology and AI capabilities. This defensive posture, while understandable from a national security perspective, risks neglecting the crucial offensive strategy: actively cultivating and promoting a global ecosystem of open-source AI rooted in democratic principles. The US seems preoccupied with guarding its technological fortresses, potentially missing the opportunity to shape the wider global landscape through the proactive dissemination of open, rights-respecting AI alternatives.
Europe’s Regulatory Paradox: Power and Paralysis
The European Union, renowned for its assertive regulatory stance in the digital realm, presents a different kind of challenge regarding open-source AI. Since the landmark implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the EU has successfully positioned itself as a global standard-setter for the digital economy. Countries and multinational corporations worldwide frequently align their practices with EU compliance frameworks, a trend extending into the domain of artificial intelligence with the advent of the comprehensive EU AI Act. This Act aims to establish risk-based regulations for AI systems across the Union.
However, when it comes to specifically addressing open-source AI, the EU’s formidable regulatory machinery appears surprisingly hesitant and its efforts somewhat underdeveloped. Article 2 of the AI Act does contain a brief mention, carving out certain exemptions from regulation for open-source AI models. Yet, the practical impact of this exemption seems limited, particularly as it doesn’t typically apply to models deployed for commercial purposes. This narrow scope significantly curtails its real-world effect on the burgeoning open-source AI landscape.
This paradoxical situation – acknowledging open source while failing to actively foster it – persists in other EU guidance documents. The most recent General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, published hypothetically in March 2025 for the sake of this discussion, might recognize the positive contributions of open-source models to developing safe, human-centric, and trustworthy AI. However, such documents often lack meaningful elaboration or concrete measures designed to actively promote the development and widespread adoption of these potentially beneficial open-source AI models. Even within strategic frameworks like the EU Competitiveness Compass – ostensibly designed to tackle overregulation and bolster strategic competitiveness in key areas like AI – the term ‘open source’ is conspicuously absent or receives minimal attention.
This cautious, almost reticent, approach from Brussels towards fully embracing and regulating open-source AI likely stems from several factors. One significant hurdle is the inherent difficulty in precisely defining open-source AI. Unlike traditional open-source software, which primarily involves source code, open-source AI encompasses complex pre-trained models, vast datasets, and intricate architectures. The lack of a universally accepted legal definition, despite efforts by organizations like the Open Source Initiative (OSI), creates a level of legal uncertainty that regulatory bodies like the European Commission are typically uncomfortable with.
Yet, the underlying driver of this relative inactivity may run deeper. The EU’s very success in establishing far-reaching regulatory regimes like GDPR might make the Commission wary of creating broad exemptions for a technology as powerful and rapidly evolving as AI, especially when its open-source variant remains somewhat ill-defined. There could be a fear that embracing open-source AI too readily, without fully established guardrails, might inadvertently weaken the EU’s hard-won global regulatory influence. This constitutes a strategic gamble – prioritizing comprehensive control over potentially fostering a more dynamic, albeit less predictable, open innovation ecosystem – a gamble that Brussels, thus far, has shown little appetite for taking decisively. This regulatory paralysis leaves a vacuum that others are readily filling.
The Shifting Geopolitical Landscape of AI
The confluence of China’s strategic push into open-source AI and the relative hesitancy of the United States and the European Union is actively reshaping the geopolitical terrain of artificial intelligence. China’s determined drive towards technological self-sufficiency, a campaign that now clearly includes solidifying its strategies around open-source AI, can be partly understood as a response to sustained US export controls targeting advanced computing hardware and semiconductors, measures implemented due to American concerns over national security, economic competitiveness, and intellectual property protection dating back several years. China’s countermeasures, including its embrace of open source, reflect the broader, intensifying strategic competition for technological supremacy between the two global powers. The EU, meanwhile, typically asserts its influence in this race not through direct technological competition on the same scale, but by setting global norms focused on protecting fundamental rights, privacy, and democratic values like fairness and algorithmic accountability – standards that have indeed shaped the policies of major global technology firms.
However, by aggressively positioning itself as a leader and advocate for open-source AI, China is cleverly turning a challenge – restricted access to certain Western technologies – into a strategic opportunity. It is effectively crafting and marketing its own distinct version of AI openness to the global community, particularly to developing nations seeking accessible AI tools. The emergence of capable Chinese models like DeepSeek’s R1, alongside offerings from other domestic tech giants such as Alibaba, is beginning to shift the global dynamics. It potentially reduces the global appetite for exclusively closed, proprietary AI models, especially if open alternatives appear more accessible or cost-effective. DeepSeek, for instance, has released smaller, less computationally demanding models suitable for devices with limited processing power. Platforms like Hugging Face, a major hub for AI development, have reportedly begun analyzing and replicating aspects of DeepSeek-R1’s training methods to improve their own models. Even Western tech giants like Microsoft, OpenAI, and Meta are increasingly exploring techniques like model distillation, which gained prominence partly due to the DeepSeek developments.
This evolving landscape reveals China proactively advancing the global conversation around AI openness, forcing the United States, for the first time, to react and adapt to this discourse. Simultaneously, the EU remains somewhat caught in a state of legal and regulatory inertia regarding open source. This asymmetry creates a noticeable power imbalance specifically within the crucial domain of open-source AI governance and proliferation.
Crucially, the version of open-source AI being propagated by China carries significant concerns for democratic societies. The CCP appears to be strategically implementing a ‘two-track’ system: encouraging relative openness and collaboration among AI developers and firms to spur innovation, while simultaneously embedding controls and limitations within public-facing models to restrict information flow and freedom of expression. This ‘openness’ is heavily conditioned by China’s established patterns of technological control, often requiring that model inputs and outputs align with state-sanctioned narratives, CCP values, and project a positive national image. Even within its globally oriented AI Safety Governance Framework, where Chinese authorities overtly embrace open-source principles, there’s telling language about AI-generated content posing threats to ‘ideological security’—a clear signal of the CCP’s inherent limits on freedom of thought and speech.
Without a robust, alternative framework grounded in the protection of democratic principles and fundamental human rights, the world risks witnessing the widespread reproduction and adoption of China’s more restrictive interpretation of open-source AI. Authoritarian regimes and potentially even non-state actors globally could readily build upon these models, enabling sophisticated censorship and surveillance while misleadingly claiming they are merely promoting technological accessibility. Focusing solely on matching China’s technological performance is therefore insufficient. Democracies must respond strategically by taking the lead in establishing and promoting democratic governance for the open-source AI era.
Forging a Transatlantic Path Forward
The current trajectory demands decisive action and renewed collaboration between the world’s leading democracies. The United States and the European Union should seriously consider embarking on a strategy of open-source diplomacy. This involves proactively advancing the development and sharing of capable, trustworthy, and rights-respecting AI models across the globe as a counterweight to authoritarian alternatives. Central to this effort is the creation of a unified governance framework for open-source AI, developed jointly by the US and EU.
To effectively shape a democratic AI future, establishing a dedicated transatlantic working group on open-source AI is a critical next step. This group should leverage existing structures where appropriate, such as the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI), but must crucially ensure the active participation and input of leading technology companies, academic researchers, and civil society experts from both sides of the Atlantic throughout the framework development process. This inclusive approach is vital for crafting standards that are both principled and practical.
Secondly, both the United States and the EU need to put tangible resources behind this vision. This means strategically directing funding towards academic institutions, research labs, and innovative startups specifically focused on developing open-source AI models that explicitly align with democratic values. Key characteristics of such models would include:
- Transparency in design and training data.
- Robust safeguards against censorship and manipulation.
- Mechanisms for accountability and bias mitigation.
- Built-in respect for privacy and fundamental rights.
Promoting these democratic models requires a clear recognition from policymakers in both Washington and Brussels that the long-term strategic benefits of fostering a global ecosystem based on these principles significantly outweigh the perceived short-term risks associated with openness. Concurrently, the EU must leverage its established regulatory prowess more decisively in this specific area. While maintaining its commitment to high standards, Brussels needs to overcome its hesitancy regarding the legal definition of open-source AI and act more swiftly to establish clear guidelines and incentives, thereby counteracting China’s growing momentum in shaping global norms. Embracing a degree of managed uncertainty may be necessary to avoid ceding further ground.
While transatlantic relations may face periodic turbulence on various fronts, the challenge posed by China’s ascendancy in open-source AI underscores the absolute necessity of US-EU collaboration over competition in this domain. Reclaiming leadership in this pivotal technological arena requires a concerted, forward-thinking transatlantic initiative. This initiative must integrate proactive policy development, targeted research funding, and support for innovation, all aimed at setting the global standard for an AI future that is genuinely rights-respecting, transparent, creative, and empowering for people worldwide. The time for hesitant observation is over; the moment for decisive, unified action is now.